Thinking and learning through technology
Jonte
Bernhard
Engineering education research group, ITN,
Linköping University, Campus Norrköping,
SE–601 74 Norrköping, Sweden.
E-mail: jonbe@itn.liu.se
It is argued that all learning and thinking is about establishing experiential human – world relationships. Thinking and learning cannot be studied in isolation. Human experiences of our lifeworld are shaped by physical and symbolic tools (mediating tools). A common denominator in the design of many “innovative” learning environments is the insightful and careful application of computer based measurement technology as a mediating tool. Our research has shown that the way these tools are designed and implemented is critical for learning outcomes. Philosophy of technology deals with such questions as what role does technology (artefacts) play in everyday human experience: How do technological artefacts affect the existence of humans and their relations with the world and within our world? How do artefacts produce and transform human knowledge and how are human knowledge included in artefacts? What are the actions of artefacts? In this paper insights from philosophy of technology and theories of mediated action will be presented and related to the design of learning environments and analysis of learning. It is concluded that the role of technology cannot be overlooked.
1. introduction
“Learning is learning to
think” according to Dewey (Dewey, 1933/1986, p.
176)
and similarly Vygotsky (1978, p. 90) argued that “properly organized learning results in
mental development”.
Following Dewey (e.g. 1933/1986;
1938/1986; cf. Holder, 1995) and James (1890) I regard thinking as a kind
of highly structured experience that emerges from less structured experiences.
Knowledge and thinking are modes of experience; they are special kinds of
mental operations thoroughly embedded in experiential situations. In his book How We Think Dewey (1933/1986, pp. 125-127) describes this as
“[Thinking] makes possible action with
a conscious aim … [Thinking] converts action ... into intelligent action. … It
makes possible systematic preparations and inventions. … It enriches things
with meanings”.
“Learning” and “thinking” are, thus closely and, I contend,
dialectically related. In line with the thoughts of Dewey, Vygotsky and others
I suggest that learning is about developing capabilities for thinking: during
learning a human being is an active thinker, and not a passive recipient, and,
in the same vein, it could be argued that developing thinking is about
developing capabilities for learning.
Experience has its foundation in the two-way transaction between human beings and their environment.
This experiential view means that learning and thinking are about human–world
relationships. A common view of the mind is that of an isolated individual with
thoughts in his/her head. In line with this metaphor for thinking is the view
of learning as acquisition of
knowledge. Another view is of learning and thinking as completely social
activities. Learning is thought of as a process of participation. In the first model learning is seen as an
individual enterprise and in the second as a social one. The experiential view refutes these dualistic
views.
The dualistic discussion of “where is the mind?” (Cobb, 1994) otherwise referred to as “two
metaphors for learning” (Sfard, 1998) can be traced back to
Descartes' views about the mind–body antimony. In our (western) culture,
dualistic ways of thinking are strongly supported by our language; some of the
resulting antinomies, other than mind–body, include individual–social,
inner–outer, cognition–emotion, reason–imagination, real–ideal, facts–values,
subject–object and theory–practice. What he calls the “myth of Descartes” and
concepts of mind are more thoroughly discussed by Ryle (1949). See also Roth, Hwang, Mafra
Goulart, and Lee (2005) for a discussion how
non-dualistic theories can be (mis–)interpreted.
I align myself with the experiential view: I see learning and thinking as developing a persons' (and a groups') ability to handle familiar and novel situations in powerful ways. As Rorty (1991) states:
“[we should not] view knowledge as a matter of getting reality right, but as a matter of acquiring habits of action for coping with reality”.
I think that much of the debate surrounding the distinction between the individual and the social mind neglects the fact that we use tools (artefacts) to support and enhance our thinking – we “think through technology” (Mitcham, 1994) or in the words of Norman (1993) “things make us smart”. In this paper I will present a discussion and study about enhancing learning in engineering education through properly implemented technology. I will also relate this to theories of mediated learning.
2. Theories of mediated action
Human experience of our world is, as briefly mentioned in the
introduction, shaped by physical and symbolic tools (mediating tools). The
concept of mediation and mediating tools could be represented diagrammatically
as:
Human
<=> Mediating tools <=> World
The role of mediating tools is discussed within theories of
education and psychological science and also within philosophy of technology.
Questions about the role of technology (artefacts) in everyday human experience
include:
How do technological artefacts affect the existence of humans
and their relationship with the world?
How do artefacts produce and transform human knowledge?
How is human knowledge incorporated into artefacts?
What are the actions of artefacts?
The use of tools is a dual process: humans both shape the world
(including human culture) and are shaped through the use of tools. This means
that humans are part of their world (and can not step outside and view the
world from the “outside”). As Cole (1996) points out:
“traditional dichotomies of subject and object, person and environment, and so on, cannot be analytically separated and temporally ordered into independent and dependent variables.” (p. 103)
Figure 1. The basic mediational triangle in which humans in inquiry
and the subject-matter of inquiry are thought of not only as directly related
but also indirectly related via an artefact/tool. The objective
(“intentionality”) of inquiry is at the same time regulating the inquiry
(Drawing modified and adapted from Cole (1996) and Vygotsky (1978)).
In the socio-cultural theory of learning developed by Vygotsky
and his co-workers and students (e.g. Cole, 1996;
Kozulin, 1998; Kozulin, Gindis, Ageyev, & Miller, 2003; Leont'ev, 1978;
Leontyev, 1981; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1991, 1998, 1979, 1985) the concepts of “tool” and
“mediation” are key. The central thesis is that the structure and development
of human psychological processes are co-constituted by the interaction with
tools. These are historically developed and could be of different types such as
“psychological tools”, “material tools”, language is also a tool. Using tools
makes it possible to act in more powerful and functional ways and enhances and
alter human development.
These tools (artefacts) are simultaneously
material and ideal/conceptual. In
the view of Vygotsky we can see the learner as an individual-in-society
learning and thinking through artefacts. Vygotsky thus transcend dualistic
thinking.
Vygotsky's ideas of artefacts as having a ”dual”
material-conceptual nature are similar to the ideas of John Dewey and can be
traced back to Engels (1925/1951), Marx (Marx & Engels,
1845/1957)
and Hegel (1807/2006). See for example Cole (1996), Valsiner & van der Veer (2000), Ihde (Ihde & Selinger,
2003)
and works within activity-theory extending and applying the ideas of Leontiev (e.g. Engeström,
Miettinen, & Punamäki, 1999; Nardi, 1996; Nardi & Kaptelinin, 2006;
Wertsch, 1991, 1979, 1985)
for a further discussion.
Ihde (2003) have pointed out the
similarities between the traditions mentioned above:
“One of the features of philosophy of technology that
differentiates it from other styles of philosophy is its necessary sensitivity
to the concrete, to materiality. The traditions of philosophy that are
predisposed to precisely this concreteness are the praxis philosophies that
include pragmatism, some strands of Marxism and neo-Marxism, and the
phenomenology and hermeneutic traditions. It is not accidental that there is
very little "analytic" philosophy of technology, and neither is it
accidental that philosophy of technology associates with the praxis
directions”. (cf. for example Davydov
& Kerr, 1995; Engeström & Miettinen, 1999; Miettinen, 2001)
Tools play an important role in Dewey's philosophy of education
and in his philosophy of technology (see for example
Hickman, 1990)
he proposed that “language [is] the tool
of tools” (Dewey, 1925/1981, p.
134).
According to Dewey “[tools play] a large
part in consolidating meanings [and they are] means to consequences, instead of
being taken directly and physically.” (ibid., p. 146) Tools are “intrinsically relational, anticipatory,
predictive” (ibid., p. 146).
Common to the thinking of both Dewey and Vygotsky was the
importance of seeing acts as dynamic
and holistic units. For example Dewey
(1896) criticised turning the
dynamic process of acting into a sequence of static and disjointed stimuli and
responses, thus eliminating the dynamic interdependence in the coordination of
movement and sensation in the act.
According to the philosopher of technology Don Ihde perception
is co-determined by technology. In science instruments do not merely “mirror
reality” but mutually constitute the reality investigated. The technology
actively shapes the relationship between humans and their world by placing
certain aspects in the foreground (and others in the background) and also by
making certain aspects of reality visible that otherwise would be invisible.
According to Ihde (e.g. 1991) neglecting the role of
instruments (i.e. technological artefacts) in science leads to naïve realism.
However in the philosophy of science the emphasis is often placed only on
concepts and ideas.
Ihde (e.g. 1979; 1991; see
also Mitcham, 1994; and Verbeek, 2000/2005) have developed the following
schematic distinctions regarding the intentional relationship between humans
and their world:
Unmediated perception:
Human <=> World
Mediated perception:
Human <=> Technology <=>World
By unmediated perception Ihde meant perception unmediated by
technological artefacts. In some sense all perception is mediated through
psychological tools such as language, theories and concepts. Within mediated
perception Ihde make the distinction between embodiment and hermeneutic
relations.
Embodiment relations:
(Human <=> Technology) <=>World
Hermeneutic relations:
Human <=> (Technology <=> World)
Alterity relations:
Human <=> Technology (<=>World)
In embodiment relations we are not normally aware of the
technology, it is almost a part of our body as it is for a blind man with a
stick or for a person wearing glasses. In ideal embodiment relations the
technology is “transparent”. In hermeneutic relations the technology is not
transparent. Some kind of interpretation is involved, hence the term hermeneutic.
Both in embodiment and hermeneutic relations experience is transformed by the
mediating technology used. In alterity relations humans are not related to the
world via a technology, or to a world-technology complex, but to a technology.
It should be stressed that in the views of Ihde these are not distinct
categories but parts of a continuum.
In his book What Things Do
Verbeek (2000/2005) claims
“the concept of mediation helps to show that technologies
actively shape the character of human-world relations. Human contact with
reality is always mediated, and technologies offer one possible form of mediation.
On the other hand, it means that any particular mediation can only arise within
specific contexts of use and interpretation.”
Figure 2. Picture of the setup in one of the labs concerning laws of motion. The motion sensor is connected to the computer via an interface. On the computer screen the result from the experiment is presented in real-time.
Thus we have to “give
artefacts a voice” and “[bring] into
account technology in educational analysis” (Waltz, 2004).
Selinger (2003) argues that if we
“[fail] to recognize the significance of non-humans [we will generate] idealistic and overly reductive analyses that [ignore] how material entities and forces influence how subjectivity is expressed.”
3. learning through technology in labs
More
than ten years ago I started reforming physics and engineering education by
starting a design based research project developing novel learning environments using computer based measurement technology
(Microcomputer Based Labs, MBL) in laboratory learning environments (Bernhard, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2006; Bernhard,
Carstensen, & Lindwall, 2005; Carstensen & Bernhard, in press;
Lindwall, Engkvist, Bernhard, Lindström, & Lymer, 2005).
Figure 3. Example of a task that students attempt to solve in the motion labs. Displayed is a v(t)-graph with a curve which the students are asked to match to an experimental graph produced by a student. The students will see their graph in real-time while trying to reproduce the prescribed graph. To successfully solve the task students have to realise the difference between position- and velocity-time graphs and several other important conceptual features.
The measurement and re-presentation technology in these labs serves as a mediating tool. The initial project was given the name “experientially based physics instruction” and the original design took Dewey's (e.g. 1938; 1925/1981; 1938/1986) theories of experience, Vygotsky's (1978) theory of mediation and the ideas of Thornton (1990; 1996) and Thornton and Sokoloff (1998) as points of departure. Later the design was further improved by applying Marton's theory of variation (Marton & Tsui, 2004). Central to this theory is that we learn through the experience of difference, rather than the recognition of similarity.
As is shown in table 1, the introduction of mediating tools in the form of MBL has dramatically changed the learning outcome as measured by the FMCE-test (Thornton & Sokoloff, 1998).
In the physics course for engineering students in the academic year 02/03 the difference made by the use of technology is clear. In the mechanics part of this course all students participated in the same lectures (20 h) and problem-solving sessions (12 h). However 25 students of a total of 125 participated in labs (16 h) using MBL-technology instead of labs using more traditional equipment. This means that, on the basis of hours taught, one third of the course was changed but the rest remained the same. The students participating in MBL-labs achieved a 48% normalised gain versus the 18% gain by the students participating in more traditional labs.
|
Teaching Method / Course |
Norm. Gain (FMCE) |
Reference |
|
Workshop physics |
65% |
Saul and Redish (1998) |
|
|
|
|
|
MBL 1997/98 |
61% |
This study |
|
Physics 02/03 MBL-labs |
48% |
This study |
|
Physics 02/03 Richardson-labs |
18% |
This study |